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Abstract
Stimulus contexts in which different intensity levels are presented to two sensory–perceptual channels can produce differential effects on
perception: Perceived magnitudes are depressed in whichever channel received the stronger stimuli. Context differentially can affect loudness
at different sound frequencies or perceived length of lines in different spatial orientations. Reported in hearing, vision, haptic touch, taste, and
olfaction, differential context effects (DCEs) are a general property of perceptual processing. Characterizing their functional properties and
determining their underlying mechanisms are essential both to fully understanding sensory and perceptual processes and to properly interpreting
sensory measurements obtained in applied as well as basic research settings.
© 2006 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
Résumé
Les contextes dans lesquels on présente des niveaux différents d’intensité de stimuli à deux canaux sensoriels/perceptuels, peuvent produire
des effets différentiels sur la perception : les intensités perçues sont diminuées dans le canal recevant les stimuli les plus intenses. Le contexte
peut affecter différentiellement la sonie de sons présentés à différentes fréquences ou la longueur perçue de lignes présentées dans différentes
orientations spatiales. Démontrés en audition, vision, perception haptique, goût et olfaction, les effets différentiels de contexte sont une propriété
générale du traitement perceptif. Caractériser ses propriétés fonctionnelles et déterminer ses mécanismes fondamentaux est essentiel pour comprendre les processus sensoriels et perceptifs, ainsi que pour interpréter correctement les mesures sensorielles réalisées dans le domaine de la
recherche fondamentale comme appliquée.
© 2006 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Contextual effects; Stimulus intensity; Perceptual magnitude; Sensory processes
Mots clés : Effets de contexte ; Intensité du stimulus ; Grandeur perceptive ; Processus sensoriels

1. Introduction
It has long been known that judgments of sensory magnitudes depend not only on the physical characteristics of each
stimulus that is judged—on its intensity, duration, qualitative
Abbreviations: DCE, differential context effect; Hz, Hertz; RT, response
time; SPL, sound pressure level.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: marks@jbpierce.org (L.E. Marks).
1162-9088/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.erap.2005.09.009

make-up, and so forth—but also on the physical characteristics
and perceptual properties of other stimuli presented either
recently or at the same time. Especially well-known in this
regard is Helson’s (1964) adaptation-level theory, developed
in large measure to account for the ways that the judgments
given to a test stimulus depend on the contextual ensemble of
other stimuli that form its immediate background. A sound of
fixed intensity and frequency, for example, may be rated as
louder or softer in the context of other relatively weaker or
stronger sounds—an example of sensory contrast.
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A line of investigation that began in the first author’s
laboratory nearly 20 years ago (Marks, 1988) led to the discovery of stimulus-specific context effects similar to, though far
from identical to, those analyzed by Helson (1964) several decades earlier. These stimulus-specific or differential contextual
effects are pervasive: They appear in virtually every sensory
modality tested. Their functional characteristics suggest that
they reflect sensory changes induced at an early stage in perceptual processing. Obviously, it is important, from a theoretical perspective, to understand these (and other) contextual
effects if we are to understand fully the mechanisms of sensory
information processing. Further, from a practical perspective,
the omnipresence of differential contextual effects in perception and perceptual judgment also underscore their relevance
to the proper interpretation of findings obtained in applied as
well as basic research settings. Consequently, the present paper
has three main goals: first, to review the main empirical findings on differential context effects (DCEs); second, to assess,
given current understanding, the likely source or sources of the
effects: whether they reflect relatively early sensory processes
or later decisional ones; and third, to show how DCEs can
affect experimental results obtained in studies assessing sensory or perceptual processes.
2. DCEs characterized
DCEs first appeared in a study that asked people to rate the
perceived magnitude (loudness) of tones that varied multidimensionally, in their frequency as well as intensity (Marks,
1988). In the basic paradigm of that study, subjects were presented tones selected from an ensemble consisting of 12 possible intensity levels (sound pressure levels, or SPLs) at each of
two sound frequencies, one low (500 Hertz, Hz) and another
high (2500 Hz). In one contextual condition (A), subjects heard
the eight lowest SPLs at 500 Hz and the eight highest SPLs at
2500 Hz, whereas in the second condition (B), the assignment
of SPLs to frequency reversed, the subjects hearing the eight
highest SPLs at 500 Hz and the eight lowest at 2500 Hz. Thus,
four SPLs at each frequency were common to the two contextual conditions, and it is the responses to these common tones
that are critical (Fig. 1).
A typical result is shown in Fig. 1, which plots the average
numerical judgments (magnitude estimates) of loudness against
SPL at 500 and 2500 Hz, separately in condition A (left side of
figure) and condition B (right side of figure). Context clearly
affected the relative (differential) responses at the two frequencies. Consider the responses to the 500 and 2500-Hz tones
when both were presented at 60 dB SPL, as they were in
both conditions. In condition A, the two tones were judged
nearly equal in loudness, the 60-dB 2500-Hz tone receiving a
very slightly greater judgment than the corresponding 500-Hz
tone; but in condition B, the 2500-Hz tone was judged much
louder than the 500-Hz tone. In general, considering just the
four stimuli at each frequency common to the two contextual
conditions, the 500-Hz tones were rated louder in condition A
versus condition B, whereas the 2500-Hz tones were rated lou-

Fig. 1. Magnitude estimates of loudness of 500 and 2500-Hz tones. In
contextual condition A (left), the SPLs at 500 Hz were low and those at
2500 Hz were high; in condition B (right), the SPLs at 500 Hz were high and
those as 2500 Hz were low. Data from Marks (1988).

der in condition B versus condition A. This is the prototypical
pattern of DCEs.
These contextual effects are not specific to the method of
magnitude estimation. Similar contextual effects arise in tasks
that use a variety of methods. For example, Schneider and Parker (1990) obtained similar findings when subjects compared
loudness intervals. Importantly, DCEs appear even when the
subject’s task is simply one of direct comparison, that is,
when the subject is presented on each trial with two stimuli
in succession and simply indicates which of them is greater.
Using ensembles of 500 and 2500-Hz tones constructed similarly to those in Fig. 1, direct loudness comparison also reveals
DCEs (Marks, 1992a, 1994) (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Psychometric functions, showing how the probability that a 2500-Hz
tone was judged louder than a 500-Hz tone, in two contextual conditions. In
condition A (left-hand function in each successive pair, open symbols), the
SPLs at 2500 Hz were 10 dB lower than they were in condition B (right-hand
function in each successive pair, filled symbols), while the SPLs at 500 Hz were
the same in both conditions. Changing the context displaces the functions as
indicated, reflecting the changes in loudness. Data from Marks (1992a).
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The study of Marks (1992a) provides an example. In this
study, condition A paired each of three SPLs at 500 Hz with
each of five SPLs at 2500 Hz, making 15 possible pairs of
stimuli to be compared on a given trial; condition B paired
the same three SPLs at 500 Hz with each of five SPLs at
2500 Hz, but the SPLs at 2500 Hz were 10 dB greater than
those in condition A. As a result, the 2500-Hz tones were perceived to be relatively softer in condition B than A, as revealed
by the displacement of the corresponding psychometric functions in Fig. 2. (For convenience of display, only two of the
three pairs of functions are shown, but the third pair gave
wholly analogous results.) To produce the same response proportions, the SPLs at 2500 Hz had to be 5–10 dB greater in
condition B (filled symbols) compared to the corresponding
SPLs in condition a (open symbols). Armstrong and Marks
(1997) reported analogous findings in a paired comparison
study of the visual perception of length of lines oriented vertically and horizontally: Changing the physical lengths of horizontal and vertical lines led to shifts in the psychometric functions analogous to the shifts shown in Fig. 2. Perceived length
was reduced at whichever spatial orientation had the greater
physical lengths.
What the data shown in Figs. 1 and 2 do not tell us is the
nature of these contextual effects. Do these effects represent a
reduction in loudness at a particular sound frequency when the
average intensity level at that frequency is high, an enhancement in loudness when the average intensity level at the frequency is low, or both reduction and enhancement? Evidence
reviewed later suggests that DCEs result from reductions in
perceived intensity when stimulus levels are high, sans
enhancement when levels are low. Unlike the upward and
downward shifts from adaptation-level reported by Helson
(1964), DCEs appear to consist exclusively of downward shifts
in perceived magnitudes—although a small amount of
enhancement is possible.
3. DCEs in hearing, vision, haptics, taste, and olfaction
3.1. When are DCEs present, and when are they absent?
The DCEs shown in Figs. 1 and 2 obviously depend on the
presence of different sound frequencies. The role of sound frequency, or more precisely of the size of the difference in sound
frequency (Δf in Hz), was tested in two subsequent studies
(Marks, 1994; Marks and Warner, 1991). Both studies showed
that the magnitude of the DCE depends systematically on the
difference between the sound frequencies of the two tones
(holding the geometric average of the sound frequencies constant). When Δf is small, DCEs are virtually absent. The DCE
appears once Δf exceeds auditory ‘critical bandwidth’, the frequency difference that marks the shift in activation from a single region of activity on the basilar membrane to two minimally overlapping regions; with subsequent increase in Δf,
the DCE increases in size toward an asymptotic level. This
outcome suggests, although it does not by itself prove, that
DCEs in loudness may be closely allied to relatively lowlevel auditory processes. In this regard, it is worth noting that
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‘low-level specificity’ of DCEs extends also to vision. Arieh
and Marks (2002) showed that the DCEs observed in the perception of length of horizontally and vertically oriented lines,
discussed earlier, do not transfer substantially between the two
eyes or to adjacent regions of the retina.
How widespread are DCEs? It is important to identify both
where DCEs do occur and where they do not. To be sure,
DCEs pervade the sensory realm: DCEs have been reported
in five sensory modalities: hearing, vision, haptic touch
(kinesthesis), taste, and olfaction. Thus, DCEs appear (a) in
hearing, in judgments of loudness when the tones take on different frequencies (e.g. Marks, 1988; Schneider and Parker,
1990); (b) in vision, in judgments of length when lines take
on different orientations (Armstrong and Marks, 1997; Arieh
and Marks, 2002), in judgments of brightness when lights
take on different colors (Marks, 1993b), and in judgments of
contrast when gratings take on different spatial frequencies
(Schneider et al., 1996); (c) in haptics (kinesthesis), in judgments of extent of arm movements made in different directions
relative to the body (Marks and Armstrong, 1996); (d) in taste,
in judgments of intensity of structurally different compounds
such as sucrose and sodium chloride (Rankin and Marks,
1991, 1992); and (e) in olfaction, again in judgments of intensity of structurally different compounds, such as vanillin and
orange (Rankin and Marks, 2000). Differential effects of stimulus context seem to characterize perceptual judgments in most
of the senses, perhaps all of them.
On the other hand, DCEs are far from universal, and, from a
theoretical perspective, the absence of DCEs can be just as
important as their presence. To summarize, DCEs seem not to
be found (or at least seem immeasurably small in size) when
the two stimuli are processed through a single, common sensory channel. For example, DCEs are substantial in judgments
of the loudness of 500 and 2500-Hz tones that vary contextually in SPL, as already discussed. But DCEs are absent
from judgments of the duration of 500 and 2500-Hz tones
that vary contextually in a similar fashion in their physical
duration (Marks, 1992b). Whereas sound intensity is processed
through what are largely separate channels for sound frequency
(critical bands, different subsets of afferent fibers), auditory
duration appears to be processed mainly through a single,
frequency-independent channel. If the difference in sound frequency becomes sufficiently small (smaller than critical bandwidth), then all of the tones are processed through a single
channel, and the DCE diminishes markedly or disappears
(Marks, 1994; Marks and Warner, 1991).
Note that the absence of a differential effect of context does
not necessarily mean that there is no contextual effect operating at all. If stimulus context affects perceptual responses to all
of the stimuli equivalently, then the net differential effect will
be nil, even though an absolute effect is present in the judgment of every stimulus. This is presumably what happens
when, say, two sound frequencies take on different contextual
sets of intensity levels, but the difference between the frequencies is smaller than critical bandwidth. In this case, the contextual effects pool more or less uniformly over all of the stimuli
at the two frequencies. Consider the following design.
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Although, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been used,
it nevertheless serves as a useful Gedanken experiment: Subjects are presented, for loudness judgment or comparison, tones
at three sound frequencies: 500, 2400, and 2600 Hz. In this
case, tones at 500 Hz fall in one critical band, tones at 2400
and 2600 Hz in another. By appropriately manipulating the
SPLs at these three frequencies, one should readily measure a
DCE between the 500-Hz tones and the 2400-Hz tones and a
DCE between the 500-Hz tones and the 2600-Hz tones; but
one would not find a DCE between the 2400-Hz tones and the
2600-Hz tones—not because these tones were unaffected by
the contextual manipulation, but because they were affected
equally by it.
Similarly, DCEs are evident in vision when subjects judge
the lengths of contextually varying horizontal and vertical
lines, but are absent when subjects judge the length of contextually varying lines of different colors (Marks, 1992b).
Whereas the perceived lengths of horizontal and vertical lines
are presumably processed through different subsets of
orientation-sensitive detectors in the visual cortex, the detectors
operate independently of color. Again, this is not to say that
lines presented in different colors are immune to effects of context, only that judgments will not show differential effects of
context in terms of color. In principle, differential effects could
be measured, however, by introducing a comparison stimulus
having a different spatial orientation.
Lastly in this regard, substantial DCEs appear in taste perception, when subjects judge the perceived intensities of contextually varying sets of concentrations of sucrose and sodium
chloride (Rankin and Marks, 1991) or of sucrose and quinine
(Rankin and Marks, 1992). And again, the DCEs presumably
arise because different gustatory receptors are maximally sensitive to sucrose, sodium chloride, and quinine. The DCEs are
not evident, however, or at least are considerably smaller,
when subjects judged contextually varying set of concentrations of sucrose and mixtures of sucrose with sodium chloride
(Rankin and Marks, 1991) or contextually varying concentrations of sucrose and saccharin (Rankin and Marks, 1992). In
each of these cases, the stimuli presumably activate largely
overlapping populations of receptors. Once more, the absence
of a DCE does not necessarily mean the absence of any contextual effect at all, but instead a more or less uniform pooling
of the contextual effect over all of the stimuli in the ensemble.
3.2. Do DCEs rely on perceived dissimilarity or neural
commonality?
The presence of DCEs in taste and olfaction (Rankin and
Marks, 1991, 1992) provide a vehicle to answer a question
raised but not answered in the studies of loudness: Do the
DCEs reflect, and presumably reside in, the activation of different neural channels per se, as already argued, perhaps as the
result of differential adaptation-like processes in these channels? Or do the DCEs arise from processes of perceptual comparison that ultimately depend on the perceived or psychological similarity/dissimilarity of the stimuli? That DCEs in
loudness appear only when the sound frequencies differ by at

least a critical bandwidth is consistent with the hypothesis that
these effects reflect unequal adaptation (different degrees of
intensity reduction) in different neural channels. But in hearing,
when the difference between sound frequencies, Δf, increases,
it is difficult to distinguish fully between a decrease in the
overlap of channels and the correlated increase in perceived
dissimilarity of pitch. As Δf increases, the populations of afferent fibers activated become more distinct, and the resulting
pitch sensations become increasingly different. The existence
of DCEs in taste and olfaction, however, provides a potential
means to distinguish between the neural-channel hypothesis
and the perceptual-dissimilarity hypothesis.
To compare the predictions of these two hypotheses, Rankin
and Marks (2000) capitalized on two important properties of
chemosensation. First, when olfactory stimuli are dissolved
and taken into the mouth, they are typically perceived as
though they are ‘tasted.’ In this process of retronasal olfaction,
the odorant-based sensations are referred to the mouth—
indeed, these olfactory-based sensations provide the lion’s
share of what is commonly called ‘flavor’ in foods and beverages. Unlike gustatory sensations (e.g. the qualities of sweet,
sour, salty, bitter, and umami (the ‘savory’ taste often used to
describe the taste of monosodium glutamate), which derive
from activation of receptors in the oral cavity, mainly on the
tongue, retronasal olfactory sensations disappear if the nose is
pinched. Rankin and Marks presented two gustatory stimuli,
sucrose and citric acid, and two olfactory stimuli, vanillin and
orange, in aqueous solutions through the mouth, allowing all of
the stimuli to be ‘tasted’.
Second, Rankin and Marks (2000) chose vanillin and
orange as olfactory stimuli not only because, at moderate concentrations, these stimuli have no taste proper (that is, produce
no gustatory sensations) but also because vanillin in particular
is perceived to be perceptually similar to sucrose. In a preliminary, similarity-scaling experiment, subjects judged the gustatory stimulus sucrose to be more similar to the olfactory stimulus vanillin (when both were taken into the mouth) than to
the gustatory stimulus citric acid. Consequently, if DCEs
depend on the activation of distinct neural channels, in this
case, activation of different modalities, then DCEs should be
present with stimulus ensembles comprising contextually varying concentrations of sucrose and vanillin. If, on the other
hand, DCEs require that the sensations be perceptually dissimilar in quality, then DCEs should be absent (or at least small in
size) in particular with varying contextual sets of sucrose and
vanillin. The results were unequivocal: Sucrose and vanillin
gave large DCEs, despite having similar perceptual qualities.
In general, neural commonality in gustation and olfaction predicts the magnitude of DCEs better than does perceived dissimilarity. DCEs in taste and olfaction, at least, appear to require
the activation of different afferent channels.
3.3. DCEs as reductions in sensory magnitudes
Because DCEs often occur when two different sets of stimuli are presented for comparison (e.g. tones differing in frequency, lines differing in spatial orientation), it may be tempt-
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ing to infer that two different sets of stimuli must be presented
in order to induce the effects. To the contrary, several experiments have now clearly shown that DCEs can arise from the
presentation of just one kind of stimulus. Indeed, in the limiting case it appears that a DCE can result from a single presentation of a single stimulus.
Marks (1993a, Experiment 15) sought to dissociate the
induction of DCEs in loudness from their measurement by having subjects first listen to context-inducing tones, then perform
a series of paired comparisons to measure the perceptual consequence. This experiment compared the efficacy of six stimulus regimens in inducing the DCEs. In two of the regimens, the
subjects listened to inducing tones that alternated between a
low-SPL at one frequency (500 or 2500 Hz) and a high-SPL
at the other (2500 or 500) Hz. In the other four regimens, the
subjects listened to repeated presentations of just a single tone:
500 or 2500 Hz at the low or high-SPL.
Fig. 3 shows the results. All of the inducing regimens that
included signals at high-SPL produced DCEs. That is, DCEs
were evident with presentation of two inducing tones, one at
high-SPL and the other at low-SPL, or with presentation of a
single tone at high-SPL. By contrast, neither of the inducing
regimens containing a single, low-SPL tone produced a DCE.
These findings make two important points: First, DCEs can
arise simply from exposure to the context-inducing stimuli; the
inducing tones need not themselves be judged. And second, the
induction of DCEs requires the presentation of relatively high
stimulus intensities, which presumably then come to suppress
loudness. Mapes-Riordan and Yost (1999); Nieder et al. (2003)
came to similar conclusions, using a paradigm in which, on
each trial, subjects hear a single inducing tone followed by a
test tone of the same frequency and then a comparison tone of
a different frequency. If low stimulus intensities induce DCEs,
the effects must be very small.
Experiments using other procedures (magnitude estimation,
as in Fig. 1; paired comparison, as in Fig. 2; and paired comparison of differences, as in Schneider and Parker (1990) show
comparable results: DCEs occur only when subjects listen to
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inducing tones of at least moderate intensity, at least 75–
80 dB SPL in hearing. Brief presentations of weaker tones
have no significant effect (Mapes-Riordan and Yost, 1999;
Marks, 1993a; Nieder et al., 2003). A similar outcome was
reported in the visual perception of length of lines: Presenting
relatively long lines in vertical or horizontal orientation produces a DCE, whereas presenting relatively short lines does
not (Armstrong and Marks, 1997). Thus considered, DCEs
seem best characterized as evidencing stimulus-specific adaptation. Although sensory adaptation often requires more than
transient exposure to stimuli, this is not always the case.
Where dark adaptation (recovery from light adaptation) takes
several minutes, brief flashes of light can produce significant
light adaptation, lasting many seconds. And in the auditory
realm, phonetic adaptation takes place in speech perception
(e.g. Samuel, 1986; Sawush, 1977), and speech sounds such
as phonemes are, ipso facto, transient stimuli.
4. Mechanisms underlying DCEs
As a working hypothesis, DCEs may be subsumed under
the broad category of adaptation or adaptation-like phenomena.
The contextual effects on loudness at different sound frequencies, for instance, have recently been called ‘induced loudness
reduction’—a reasonable descriptive term, given that loudness
adaptation has been defined exclusively as the changes in loudness of sounds over long periods of time; changes in sensitivity
or response resulting from transient exposure to very intense
sounds is labeled in psychoacoustics as ‘fatigue.’ Nevertheless,
a central theoretical question asks whether DCEs represent
channel-specific sensory changes—changes in the underlying
neural and psychological representations of perceptual magnitudes—or changes in decisional criteria.
Consider the following example. Assume that at baseline,
before any contextual manipulation, subjects judge 500-Hz
tones and 2500-Hz tones that are equal in SPL to be equal in
loudness. Thus, a 65-dB tone at 500 Hz is judged as loud as a
65-dB tone at 2500 Hz. After baseline measurement, subjects
then listen to several repetitions of a 2500-Hz tone presented at

Fig. 3. The probability of judging a 2500-Hz tone louder than a 500-Hz tone before (baseline) and after listening to a sequence of inducing tones. Left panel:
Sequences contained 40 low-SPL 500-Hz tones and 40 high-SPL 2500-Hz tones (condition A) or 40 high-SPL 500-Hz tones and 40 low-SPL 2500-Hz tones
(condition B). Right: Sequences contained 40 low-SPL 500-Hz tones, 40 high-SPL 2500-Hz tones, 40 low-SPL 500-Hz tones, or 40 high-SPL 2500-Hz tones. Data
from Marks (1993a).
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either 30 dB or 80 dB SPL. Presenting the 30-dB tone leaves
loudness unaffected: a 65-dB tone at 2500 Hz is still as loud as
a 65-dB tone at 500 Hz. But presenting the 80-dB tone reduces
loudness at 2500 Hz. Now, in order to match the loudness of a
2500-Hz tone at 65 dB, the SPL of a 500-Hz tone needs be
only 58 dB. Context has reduced the loudness, or the loudness
judgment, at 2500 Hz by the equivalent of 7 dB. Now, two
explanations are possible, encapsulated by the terms ‘loudness’
and ‘loudness judgment’ in the last sentence. Context may
have reduced the underlying sensory response (loudness) by
7 dB. Alternatively, context may have influenced the process
of loudness comparison, so that subjects now ‘judge’ loudness
at 2500 Hz to be smaller even though the sensory representation is unchanged.
Is it possible to distinguish sensory from decisional explanations of DCEs? Methods and theory of signal detection theory provide a possible means—if, for example, DCEs were
evident at threshold, where detection paradigms could be
used. Unfortunately, DCEs are absent at threshold (MapesRiordan and Yost, 1999). Fortunately, it is possible to transfer
the decision-theoretic logic of signal detection theory to the
realm of speeded choice response paradigms, where the joint
analysis of response times (RTs) and errors can play a role akin
to that of receiver operating characteristics in signal detection
theory. In brief, when subjects are faced with a task requiring
different responses to stimulus A and stimulus B, and these
responses are to be made as quickly as possible, then speed
and accuracy often trade: As the subjects respond more rapidly,
the gain in speed (reduction in time) is offset by an increase in
errors—analogous to the increase in false alarms that occurs
when hit rate increases in tasks of signal detection and discrimination.
Using this logic, Arieh and Marks (2003a) transposed the
original loudness-rating paradigm of Marks (1988) into a
speeded choice paradigm. In doing this, Arieh and Marks
relied on the well-established finding that RT can serve as a
surrogate for perceived magnitude: When stimulus intensity
increases, sensory magnitude also increases, while RT to the
stimulus decreases, though sometimes approaching a lower
asymptote at high intensities. Further, RT can serve as a surrogate for perceived intensity both in simple RT paradigms,
where subjects respond to the onset of any stimulus as quickly
as possible, and in choice RT paradigms, where subjects must
identify the stimulus by making one response or another.
In their choice experiment, Arieh and Marks (2003a) asked
subjects to decide as quickly as they could whether the frequency of each test tone was low (500 Hz) or high
(2500 Hz), while in different conditions the contextual set of
intensity levels varied. Arieh and Marks asked the following
questions: When the SPLs at 2500 Hz increase, thereby
decreasing loudness at 2500 Hz, does RT at 2500 Hz increase
correspondingly? And if RT does increase, is the increase in
RT accompanied by a corresponding decrease in errors
(speed-accuracy tradeoff, indicating decisional change) or by
no change in errors (no speed-accuracy tradeoff, indicating a
sensory change)?

Fig. 4. Choice RTs (y axis) and error rates (listed next to each data point) for
500-Hz tones in two contextual conditions. In condition A (filled circles) the
SPLs at 500 Hz were low and those at 2500 Hz (not shown) were high; in
condition B (open circles) the SPLs at 500 Hz were high and those at 2500 Hz
(not shown) were low (data from Arieh and Marks, 2003a).

Fig. 4 shows a sample of the results. The 500-Hz tones at 50
and 65 dB were classified faster in condition A, where the
average SPL was relatively low, than condition B, where the
average was higher. Importantly, subjects also made fewer
errors in condition A, whereas the decisional model predicts
more errors. These results are clear-cut: RTs show DCEs as
expected, and the changes in choice RT are not accompanied
by offsetting changes in accuracy. The findings are therefore
consistent with the hypothesis that the DCEs reflect changes
in the underlying sensory representations of loudness.
Recent research, in several different laboratories, has sought
to evaluate contextually induced changes in loudness in greater
detail, and in particular to evaluate the temporal properties of
these DCEs—which some investigators have dubbed ‘induced
loudness reduction’ (see Scharf et al., 2002; Nieder et al.,
2003). In one of it simplest instantiations, the subjects hear a
single context-inducing stimulus, whose effects are tested at
various points in time afterwards. Arieh and Marks (2003b)
found no decrease in loudness for the first 150 ms after the
offset of the inducing stimulus. The maximal effect occurred
about 825 ms after the inducer’s offset. Moreover, according
to recent evidence, full recovery after exposure to as few as
five inducing stimuli can take scores of seconds, even minutes
(Arieh et al., 2005). That DCEs dissipate slowly has important
consequences for sensory measurement.
5. DCEs and sensory evaluation
In this final section, we describe two of the many ways that
DCEs may ‘intrude’ on sensory evaluations. In each case, the
DCE results from a mismatch between two sets of stimuli—or,
and this is more likely to be critical, from a mismatch between
the perceptual magnitudes produced by the two sets of stimuli.
These examples are meant to serve only as illustrations of the
ways that contextual effects pervade research on basic and
applied topics in sensation and perception. It is important to
keep in mind three central characteristics of DCEs: First, they
are ubiquitous, appearing in virtually all if not all sensory modalities. Second, they are relatively long lasting, a few brief stimuli being capable of effecting changes that last more than a
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minute. And third, they arise automatically, in a wide variety of
psychophysical paradigms. Almost any stimulus ensemble that
includes moderately high levels, such as tones of about 80 dB
or greater, is capable of producing an adaptation-like effect.
Whether the effects matter to the scientific questions being
asked, however, often depend on whether there is an opportunity for the presence of differential effects. If the contextual
effects apply equally to all stimuli in the ensemble, then the
effects are not differential. Many experimental paradigms,
however, do permit the opportunity for differential effects to
arise, as shown in the following pair of examples.
5.1. Differential effects of stimulus context on perceptual
illusions
The first example arises from the observations of DCEs in
the judgment of linear extent, when made both by vision and
by haptic touch. In vision, the perceived length of horizontal
and vertical lines depends systematically on contextual sets of
physical lengths presented in the two spatial orientations (Armstrong and Marks, 1997; Arieh and Marks, 2002; Potts, 1991).
Presenting physically long vertical lines reduces the perceived
length of verticals, and presenting physically long horizontal
lines reduces the perceived length of verticals. Thus, the ratio
of perceived vertical length to perceived horizontal length is
sensitive to stimulus context.
The presence of DCEs in judgments of visual length bears
consequences in turn for the well-known horizontal–vertical
illusion in vision: the tendency for vertical lines to appear
greater than horizontal lines of the same physical length.
Although the illusion is often studied with configural stimuli
—the horizontal and vertical segments being joined either at
the ends, in an L configuration, or at the center of the horizontal, in a T configuration—the illusion is also readily shown in
isolated line segments (Armstrong and Marks, 1997; Potts,
1991; Prinzmetal and Gettleman, 1993). In relatively ‘neutral’
conditions, the illusion amounts to about 8%—which means
that the horizontal segment needs to be about 1.08 times as
long, physically, as the vertical to be judged equally long. If
visual length is proportional to physical length, then it also
means that a vertical will appear about 8% longer than a physically equal horizontal. But, as we said, the 8% rule holds
only in neutral conditions, where there are no DCEs. Increasing the lengths of the set of verticals reduces the perceived
length of verticals, thereby reducing the size of the horizontal–vertical illusion, while increasing the length of the set of
horizontals reduces the perceived length of horizontals, thereby
increasing the size of the illusion (Armstrong and Marks, 1997;
Potts, 1991).
Haptic touch is susceptible to an analogous illusion, known
as the radial-tangential illusion, or RTI. Movements of the arm
radial to the torso (e.g. away from the front of the body) are
perceived as greater than physically equal movements made
tangential to the torso (e.g. across the frontal plane) (Wong,
1977). But because perceived extent of arm movements is susceptible to differential effects of stimulus context based on
direction of movement, the magnitude of the RTI itself is con-
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textually sensitive (Marks and Armstrong, 1996). Both the horizontal–vertical illusion in vision and the RTI in haptics
(kinesthesis) depend systematically on stimulus context.
5.2. Effects of aging in chemosensation
A topic that has commanded great attention in recent years
is the effect of aging on sensory and perceptual processing. Of
special interest here are studies showing age-related changes in
chemosensory function. Several lines of inquiry have shown,
for example, marked age-related losses of olfactory function,
as assessed by the ability to identify odorants (e.g. Doty et
al., 1984; Larsson et al., 2000) and to detect them (e.g. Cain
and Gent, 1991). A few studies have also sought to quantify
the degree to which perceived olfactory intensity declines with
age, a topic that is particularly relevant to eating and food
intake: Most of a food’s flavor (‘taste’, in the vernacular)
comes from olfaction—from the activation of olfactory receptors by air-borne molecules that travel from the mouth to olfactory mucosa retronasally, through the nasopharynx. Because
olfactory magnitudes decline with age (Stevens and Cain,
1985), these declines could account for the common complaint
made by many elderly individuals that foods have ‘lost their
taste’.
To assess how age can affect perceived odor intensities,
some investigators have used procedures in which young and
older subjects rate, on a common sensory scale, the intensities
of stimuli presented in two modalities: olfaction, the modality
of interest, and a second, calibrating, modality, chosen to be
relatively impervious to effects of age (e.g. Stevens and Cain,
1985). By comparing the responses given to olfactory stimuli
to responses given to stimuli on the calibrating modality, it
should be possible, in principle, to assess the relative change
in olfaction due to age. The question we ask here is, could
DCEs influence the outcome?
At first glance, it might appear that DCEs should not affect
the outcome of interest—the difference between relative olfactory responses in young and old—because, in the experiments
just described, the young and old subjects are presented identical sets of stimuli, both to olfaction and to the calibrating
modality. And, to be sure, if DCEs depend on stimulus intensity per se, then the DCEs should be equivalent in the two age
groups. Differential effects may be present, but if so, then they
should be equal in the young and old, and therefore should not
modify the effect of age. But further consideration suggests a
more complicated picture.
Let us assume that older subjects do perceive odor intensities to be weaker than younger subjects do. Then, by presenting the same stimuli to both groups, the older subjects will
experience weaker olfactory sensations than will the younger
ones. We have already noted that DCEs are induced only by
strong stimuli; further, it is reasonable to assume that this normally happens because strong stimuli also produce strong sensory responses. If so, then the strength of the olfactory sensations evoked in the older subjects will resemble the strength of
sensations evoked by lower concentrations in younger subjects.
To the young subjects, the odorants delivered in the experiment

220

L.E. Marks, Y. Arieh / Revue européenne de psychologie appliquée 56 (2006) 213–221

are perceived as relatively strong, and thus the perceived magnitudes are contextually reduced (relative to the calibrating
modality). To the old subjects, however, the odorants are less
strong, and so their perceived magnitudes are not reduced contextually, or are reduced less than they are in the young. If the
olfactory sensations are contextually reduced to a greater extent
in the younger than the older subjects, then the results will
show a smaller effect of age than they would were the contextual effects in young and old equal. In brief, by presenting the
same stimuli to both young and older subjects, the effect of
aging could be underestimated.
Marks et al. (1988, Experiment 9) tested the implications of
this line of reasoning by having young (20–35-year-old) and
older (65–79-year-old) subjects rate, on a common
magnitude-estimation scale, the odor intensity of butyl alcohol
(butanol) and the taste intensity of sodium chloride (the latter is
not noticeably affected by age). In the first condition of the
experiment, the two groups received the same sets of olfactory
and gustatory stimuli, and the results showed a substantial
effect of aging: The olfactory stimuli were judged 25% weaker
by the old versus the younger subjects, when calibrated against
the judgments of sodium chloride. If, however, there were
effects of stimulus context, as just argued, then the olfactory
judgments were reduced by DCEs to a greater extent in the
young than the older subjects, and the results obtained in the
first condition thereby underestimate the effect of age.
Given these considerations, Marks et al. (1988) ran a second
condition with the same subjects: The young subjects received
exactly the same concentrations of butanol and sodium chloride that they received in the first condition, but the older subjects received higher concentrations of butanol only, selected to
compensate for their loss in olfactory response, and thereby to
equalize the DCEs in the two groups. After adjusting stimulus
concentrations in this manner, the results obtained in the second condition showed an even greater effect of age on olfactory responses: Now the olfactory stimuli were depressed by
more than 50% in elderly compared to young subjects. By
implication, in the first condition, the DCEs had reduced the
magnitude of the age effect by more than half.
6. Conclusion
It is a truism to say that contextual effects pervade human
sensory processing and perceptual judgments. But truisms are,
by definition, true, and often they are useful. Contextual effects
pervade perception and perceptual judgments, both in laboratory settings and in the world outside the laboratory. When the
recent context includes brief, moderately strong stimuli that are
processed through different neural channels (e.g. critical bands
of sound frequency in hearing, horizontal and vertical spatial
orientations in vision), the stimuli can produce subsequent
decrements in perceived magnitudes. And if these decrements
in magnitude are unequal in different processing channels, the
result is a DCE: Stimuli processed through the channel that
received the strongest contextual stimuli are perceived as relatively weaker than stimuli processed through other channels.

Differential effects of stimulus context have been reported
in hearing, vision, haptic touch (kinesthesis), taste, and olfaction and thus probably reflect a general characteristic of intensity processing in the nervous system—most likely, low-level
“adaptation-like” processes rather than high-level decisional
biases. Stimulus contexts have been shown, for example, to
affect perceptual illusions, such as the horizontal–vertical illusion in vision and the RTI in kinesthesis, and measurements of
the effect of aging on olfactory perception. Differential effects
of stimulus context are ubiquitous, and it can be perilous to
ignore them.
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